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1. Introduction
Ten years ago I canvassed differences between European and
American law enforcement practices (specifically, with respect to
search and seizure and interrogation) and evaluated empirical
research that might help determine the relative impact of these
differences.' This article is an update of that effort. Since 2000,
t Christopher Slobogin teaches at Vanderbilt Law School as a Milton R. Underwood
Chair in Law. He is also a director of Vanderbilt Law School's Criminal Justice
Program. Professor Slobogin received his J.D. and LL.M. from the University of
Virginia.
I Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and
European Regulatory Approaches to Police Regulation, 22 MiCH. J. INT'L L. 423 (2001).
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legal developments have been numerous, especially in connection
with the regulation of interrogation in Europe.2 The past ten years
have also produced a considerable amount of research evaluating
the effectiveness of specific police investigative practices.3 This
article exposes how much we still do not know after a decade of
additional research and describes a type of empirical work-what
I call "comparative empiricism"-that can fill the gap.
Comparative empiricism is an empirical assessment of the
relative effectiveness of different nations' regulatory regimes. In
the law enforcement context, this type of assessment may turn out
to be extremely useful. Indeed, it might be the only realistic
means of determining which combination of regulatory
mechanisms will best protect against government over-reaching,
without unduly stymying good police-work. Domestic research
that attempts to explore differing methods of limiting police
discretion either occurs in experimental settings that undermine
generalizability or is constrained by national laws that prohibit or
limit the ability to manipulate investigatory rules. In contrast, the
significant country-by-country differences in police regulation,
combined with the relatively consistent demands of police work
across countries, provide a naturalistic setting for testing the
effectiveness of a wide array of rules. In particular, comparative
empirical work that uses the same metric for gauging
effectiveness-this article proposes "hit rates" for searches and
seizures and confessions, and clearance rates for interrogations-
can provide a unique source of information to policymakers.
Part II discusses the relevant positive law. Part III describes
the most recent research studying the effects of that law. Part IV
lays out an empirical agenda.
II. American and European Regulation of Investigative
Practices
The focus of this article will be search and seizure and
interrogation, the two most prominent methods of obtaining
incriminating evidence. The discussion will emphasize those rules
that provide the starkest contrasts between the United States and
other countries and that have been the subject of empirical study.
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra Part III.
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The discussion of European law will draw primarily from the law
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, as well as from
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
A. Search and Seizure Law
One important difference between European law and
American law in the search and seizure domain is that American
police who want to search a home are more likely than European
police to need a search warrant based on individualized suspicion,
issued by a judicial officer. In the United States, a warrantless
search of a house may occur only if police obtain consent, are in
hot pursuit of a suspect, or have reasonable suspicion to believe
confederates of a person arrested in a home are on the premises.'
Furthermore, police are encouraged to seek warrants by United
States v. Leon, which held that reasonable good faith reliance on a
warrant that turns out to be defective does not require exclusion of
any evidence that is found. In the United Kingdom, on the other
hand, police can conduct a warrantless search of the entire home
incident to arrest as well as during some period of time both before
and after the arrest. As a result, under 15% of premise searches in
the United Kingdom are authorized by warrant.' The proportion
of searches based on American-style warrants in France and
Germany is probably even lower. In France on those few
occasions when a warrant is required, a judicial officer, or in some
cases a prosecutor, issues a "rogatory commission," which need
not be based on any particular level of suspicion or specify the
place to searched or item to be seized.' In Germany, warrants are
not required if there is "danger in delay," a concept defined much
4 See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS, chs. 6, 7, 12 (5th ed. 2008).
5 468 U.S. 896 (1984).
6 David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY 149, 157 (Craig Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) ("the constable may search any
premises where the person was when, or immediately before, he was arrested. . . .").
7 VAUGHN BEVAN & KEN LIDSTONE, A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE ACT OF 1984, at 445-46 (1985) (also finding that about 55% of warrantless
house searches were incident to arrest).
8 Richard S. Frase, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 201, 211 (during
investigation of a flagrant offense police may "enter and search the domicile of all
'persons who appear to have participated"' without a warrant). Id. at 211-12 (rogatory
commissions "are far less confining than an Anglo-American search warrant.").
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more broadly than the American "hot pursuit" exception to the
warrant rule.9 Only about 10% of home searches in Germany are
conducted with a warrant,o although police must usually obtain
judicial confirmation of the search within two or three days of the
search."
Thus, warrantless home searches are relatively more common
in Europe. At the same time, some European jurisdictions impose
constraints on home searches that American doctrine does not.
For instance, in the United Kingdom consent to search a home
must be in writing.' 2 In France and Germany, either the resident
or some other neutral third party must observe the search."
A second, more subtle difference between American and
European rules occurs in connection with street stops. In every
country under consideration here police may stop and question an
individual who is acting suspiciously. In the United States, such a
stop must be based on "articulable" suspicion, can evolve into a
frisk if there is a reasonable suspicion the person is armed, and
must end within five minutes or so unless probable cause to arrest
develops. 4 In France, the same general power exists, but police
are also permitted to engage in an "identity check" procedure,
which permits detention for up to four hours if, after a reasonable
suspicion stop, the individual refuses to provide or is unable to
furnish identification. In the United Kingdom, provisions that
went into effect between 2003 and 2005 require officers to make a
record of every stop and search, which must indicate the reason for
9 Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 243, 249-50, n. 29
("police often assume that there is 'danger in delay,"' including when attainment of an
arrest warrant but not a search warrant). However, a recent German Constitutional Court
decision may have tightened this exception. See STEPHEN C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CASEBOOK APPROACH 57 n.89 (2d ed. 2008).
10 Weigend, supra note 9, at 250 n. 34.
11 THAMAN, supra note 9, at 57.
12 Id. at 54.
13 Frase, supra note 8, at 211; GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 106 (Horst
Neibler trans., 1973).
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing frisks on reasonable suspicion);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (fifteen minute detention in a small room based on
reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment).
15 Frase, supra note 8, at 209-10. In Hiibel v. Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute permitting an arrest for failure to identify oneself if
the police reasonably expect criminal activity is afoot, but few states have such statutes.
324 [Vol. XXXVII
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICISM
the stop, its outcome, and the ethnicity of the stopped individual,
who must receive a copy of the report." Although a few police
departments in the United States have adopted or been forced to
adopt similar reporting procedures," stops in most American
jurisdictions are not documented.
A final key difference between European and American search
and seizure law has to do with the manner in which these rules are
enforced. While exclusion is the usual response to an illegal
search and seizure in the United States,' 8 that remedy is rarely
resorted to in Europe. In the United Kingdom, exclusion occurs
only if the police illegality was egregious,19 in Germany only if the
invasiveness of the action outweighs the importance of the
evidence or the seriousness of the crime,20 and in France only in
connection with a limited number of technical violations.2'
European jurisdictions tend to rely on administrative penalties to
enforce search and seizure rules.22 This tendency was bolstered by
the European Court of Human Rights decision in Khan v. United
Kingdom,23 which held that a failure to exclude illegally seized
16 Feldman, supra note 6, at 151. Identifying information is not included,
however. See Crime Security Act, ch. 17, §56 (Eliz.) (2010).
17 See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF Arr'Y GEN. STATE OF N.Y., THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICES (1999) [hereinafter
NEW YORK REPORT] (mandating reporting requirements).
18 See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, ch. 2.
19 Feldman, supra note 6, at 163 ("English law has no general exclusionary rule for
improperly obtained evidence" but illegally seized evidence might be excluded if its
admission "would make the proceedings unfair.").
20 Weigend, supra note 9, at 251-52 (exclusion depends on the "grievousness of the
violation," "the importance of the individual interest," "the relevance of the evidence and
the seriousness of the offense."); Mohr Siebeck, Truth or Process?: The Use of Illegally
Seized Evidence in a Criminal Trial, in GERMAN NAT'L REPORTS TO THE 18TH INT'L
CONG. OF COMPARATIVE LAW 688-93 (2010) (noting that exclusion is most likely to
occur in connection with wiretapping and other very serious intrusions).
21 See Frase, supra note 8, at 212; Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice
as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out,
and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 542, 586 (1990) ("[t]t might be argued
that French rights are worthless because of the narrow scope of exclusionary remedies
available in that country.").
22 See Frase, supra note 8, at 213-14; see also John H. Langbein & Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549,
1554-55 (France); id. at 1563-64 (Germany).
23 Khan v. U.K., 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (2001).
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evidence does not automatically render a trial unfair under the
European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention).
B. Interrogation Law
Virtually all western democracies grant suspects a right to
remain silent when questioned by the police. Differences surface,
however, in connection with how the right is implemented. In the
United States, police must give the famous Miranda warnings
informing suspects that they have a right to remain silent and a
right to counsel both before and during interrogation.2 4 In France,
in contrast, until very recently the suspect was not told of the right
to remain silent and had a very limited right to counsel.25 In the
United Kingdom and Germany suspects have for some time been
apprized of their right to remain silent. But in both countries a
suspect is also informed that exercise of that right may, in the
words of the British statute, "harm your defense if you do not
mention when questioned something which you later rely on in
court," and in both questioning may continue after assertion of the
right.26 Suspects must also be told of their right to counsel before
interrogation in both the United Kingdom and Germany, 27 but only
in the former country is there a right to counsel during
interrogation, 28 and advisement of this right may be delayed if
officials decide that its exercise would lead to "interference" with
obtaining evidence.2 9
In the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights has
handed down a number of decisions to the effect that questioning
in the absence of an attorney violates the Convention. But most of
these cases involved vulnerable suspects (e.g., juveniles,
24 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25 See Frase, supra note 8, at 216 (pre-2011 law).
26 Feldman, supra note 6, at 167 (English law); Weigend, supra note 9, at 256, 258
(German law). But see Siebeck, supra note 20, at 699-700, n. 122 (indicating that in
Germany the only disadvantage that can be mentioned at sentencing is the fact of a
"stubborn denial" during interrogation).
27 See Weigend, supra note 9, at 256 (German law); see also Feldman, supra note
6, at 168 (English law).
28 In Germany, "[t]he majority view does not recognize a right of the suspect to
have (even retained) counsel present during police interrogations." See Weigend, supra
note 9, at 258.
29 Feldman, supra note 6, at 168.
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alcoholics);30 neither the European Court's decisions nor the
European Union's initial proposals on the issue guaranteed
counsel during interrogation." Recent developments in France,
however, indicate that the Court's decisions will be interpreted
broadly, at least in that country. As of April 15, 2011, French
suspects must be told of their right to silence and must be provided
with a lawyer throughout interrogation.3 2
Furthermore, as in the search and seizure context, European
rules place other types of constraints on the police that do not
exist, at least on a uniform basis, in the United States. In the
United Kingdom, cautions are required as soon as the individual
becomes a suspect rather than, as they are in the United States,
delayed until the person is put in custody." Furthermore, England
requires taping of all questioning in the stationhouse and places
limitations on the duration and timing of interrogation," rules that
are not required by the U.S. Supreme Court and are found
statewide in only a few American jurisdictions." In both the
United Kingdom and Germany, affirmative misrepresentations
about the evidence are barred,36 and in Germany attempts to obtain
30 See Annemarieke Bejier, False Confessions During Police Investigations and
Measures to Prevent Them, 18 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 311, 332-36
(2010).
31 Id at 344.
32 See Jackie Hodgson, Storming the Bastille . . . Or at least the Police Station,
JACKIE HODGESON'S BLOG (May 2, 2011, 9:04 PM),
http://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/jackiehodgson/. Initial reports indicate that 60% of suspects
are requesting lawyers and that French courts are excluding confessions obtained from
suspects whose requests are not honored. Id; see generally Jacqueline Hodgson,
Safeguarding Suspects' Rights in EU Criminal Justice: A Comparative Perspective,
NEW CRIMINAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
33 Feldman, supra note 6, at 167 (suspects must be given cautions when police
"have reasonable grounds to suspect that the interviewee has committed an offence").
Furthermore, if a suspect asks for counsel, one is actually provided-unlike in the United
States. However, two-thirds of English suspects waive the right to counsel and Since
counsel is not permitted to foreclose questioning, the right is less robust than in the
United States. See Craig Bradley, Interrogation and Silence: A Comparative Study, 27
Wis. INT'L LAW J. 289-90 (2009).
34 Feldman, supra note 6, at 167.
35 See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Interrogations: Everybody
Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1131-33 (2005) (describing U.S. practices
regarding videotaping).
36 Feldman, supra note 6, at 169 (describing English statutory provisions
2011] 327
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXVII
statements through placing an informant in the suspect's cell are
also impermissible.3 7 in contrast to U.S. Supreme Court opinions
that allow police to lie about the evidence in their possession,38
the subject matter of the investigation,39 and (at least prior to
charging) the identity of the inquisitor.40
European countries are much more likely to exclude illegally
obtained statements than evidence obtained through illegal
searches and seizures.4' However, unlike in the United States, in
the United Kingdom suppression is not required for inadvertent or
insubstantial violations of interrogation rules or if the breach did
not affect the suspect's decision to confess.42 In Germany and
France, evidence found as a result of illegally obtained statements,
such as weapons or contraband, is generally not excluded (a
practice upheld by the European Court of Human Rights),43
whereas such evidence is often suppressed in the United States as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." 44
prohibiting "incentives to confess" and a case excluding a confession where evidence
was misrepresented); John Baldwin, Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or
Proof?, 33 BRIT. J. CRIM. 325, 331 n.27 (1993) (suggesting that deceptive techniques are
rare in Great Britain); Weigend, supra note 9, at 258 (In Germany, "[t]ricks and
fraudulent tactics of the police to make a suspect talk are generally discouraged by the
courts" although "withholding of available information" is acceptable.).
37 Weigend, supra note 9, at 259 ("[P]lacing a detained suspect in a cell together
with a police informer instructed to elicit incriminating information is unlawful
'coercion."').
38 See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (admitting statements made by
suspect who was told, falsely, that his co-defendant had confessed); see Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (stating that police fabrication about finding the
suspect's fingerprints at the scene of the crime "has nothing to do with whether
respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule").
39 See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1987) (admitting statement about
a homicide by a suspect who was told by police he was going to be asked questions
about a firearms crime).
40 See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that suspect in jail was not
"in custody" when questioned by a cellmate, but leaving open the question of whether
the deception violated "due process").
41 Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 399
(2001); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42 Feldman, supra note 6, at 171-72.
43 Gafgen v. Germany, App. No. 22978/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 51-53 (2008).
44 Compare Weigend, supra note 9, at 261 ("evidence derived from unwarned or
coerced statements has . . . been held admissible . . .") with Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (recognizing "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine).
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III. The Lessons of Empirical Research
The foregoing discussion identified a number of areas in which
American and European police investigative rules diverge, six of
which raise issues that have been the focus of empirical research
in the United States, Europe, or both: (1) the protection provided
by warrants; (2) reporting requirements for stops on the street; (3)
the deterrent effect of exclusion in search and seizure cases; (4)
the effect of pre-interrogation warnings and variations thereon; (5)
the impact of deception during interrogation; and (6) the impact of
a taping requirement for interrogations. That research is briefly
discussed here.
A. Warrants
The assumption behind the warrant requirement is that judicial
oversight will improve the probability that evidence will be
discovered.4 5 Research testing this proposition is thin. In my
earlier work, I suggested that because the known suppression rate
in cases involving warrants was similar to the suppression rate for
all contested searches (12% to 14.6%), the added protection
provided by warrants might not be substantial.4 6 However,
because it does not provide any information about uncontested
searches, this comparison only tells us something about how often
judges and police get it wrong, not how often they get it right.
A better test of the latter proposition would compare the
success rate of searches with and without warrants. From the
United States, we have studies on the success rates of warrant-
based home searches; these range from 46% to 91%, with an
average of over 70%.47 But there are no data, from the United
45 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (The warrant
requirement ensures that inferences will "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of ... by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."),
46 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 431.
47 RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESs 38 tbl.21 (Nat'l
Ctr. for State Courts, 1985). This study actually reported a hit rate of 84 to 97%, but in
all seven jurisdictions studied a certain number of returns were not provided for warrants
that were issued; on the assumption that the lack of a return meant that no evidence was
found, the resulting hit rates were 46% to 91%. In a study of San Diego narcotics search
practices the hit rate was 65% for home warrants that were executed. Laurence A.
Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary
Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 249-50
3292011]
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States or elsewhere, on the extent to which warrantless home
searches produce evidence. The only empirical work that comes
close to providing that information was conducted in the United
States in connection with searches of cars. Under U.S. law,
searches of cars generally do not require a warrant, but they still
often must be based on probable cause.48 Yet the available U.S.
data indicate that the success rate for probable cause searches of
cars ranges from 35% to 52%, much lower than the hit-rate range
for warrant-based searches of homes.49 Given this differential, it
may well be that the extra effort associated with obtaining a
warrant creates a greater incentive, perhaps a significantly greater
incentive, for the police to be sure the search will produce
evidence.so
Of course, even if warrant-based searches produce higher
success rates, they may not be optimal if they stall a large number
of legitimate investigations. The hassle connected with obtaining
a warrant can be substantial, although the advent of telephonic
warrants alleviates that burden somewhat.5 I To what extent does
the extra step of seeking a warrant deter police from searching
homes for which there is in fact probable cause, thus resulting in
lost evidence and lost convictions? Might not an ex post sanction
(like exclusion or damages) be a more efficient way of
(2000). See also Michael A. Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth
Amendment: The Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 723 (1972)
(reporting a hit rate for warrant-based homes searches of 64% and 70% in two different
years in Connecticut).
48 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
49 See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 700 tbl.14 (2002) (reporting
that 52.5% of probable-cause searches of cars yielded drugs, although also reporting that
only a little under 10% produced significant quantities of drugs); JOHN C. LAMBERTH,
SAN ANTONIO RACIAL PROFILING DATA ANALYSIS STUDY, FINAL REPORT FOR THE SAN
ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT 48 tbl.8 (2003), available at
http://www.sanantonio.gov/SAPD/pdf/LamberthSanAntonioRpt 2003.pdf (showing hit
rates for probable cause car searches of 34.9% for blacks and 40. 1% for whites).
50 See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 926 (1986); see also
Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 926
(2009).
51 One study found that telephonic warrants-issued by a magistrate over the
phone-reduced the time needed to obtain authorization for a search from three to four
hours to one and one-half hours (and usually produced more information than written
affidavits in similar cases). VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 47, at 85-87.
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incentivizing police to develop sufficient justification for searches
of the home? These questions are not answered by empirical
work. Perhaps the best that can be said, based on the available
research-in particular, research exploring electronic surveillance
of organized crime and other serious offenses-is that if the
government really wants particular evidence and the only way to
obtain it legally is through a warrant process, it will devote the
time and resources necessary to obtain one.52
B. Street Stops
In the past decade a number of studies have investigated the hit
rate of police stops and subsequent risks. During a two-year
period in the late 1990s, a New York police Street Crimes Unit
made 45,000 stops, 20% of which resulted in an arrest or criminal
charges.5 ' A second study of policing, after the city adopted
"aggressive patrolling," looked at more than 500,000 stops, 20%
of which involved pat downs or more coercive action, but only
10% of which resulted in arrest, mostly for drug offenses.54
A hit rate of 10% is not particularly impressive, especially
since it is based on police reports about their own actions and thus
might under report the number of stops that take place (which will
inflate the hit rate). Prosecutors might respond that police are only
required to have reasonable suspicion for such stops, a quantum of
suspicion well below the more likely than not standard implied by
probable cause. But other evidence suggests that, at least in high
crime areas, a one-in-ten success rate is not much better than the
crime detection rate that would be produced by simply stopping
everyone, at least if the stops take place in "high crime" areas.56
52 See Max Minzner & Christopher M. Anderson, Do Warrants Matter?, CARDOZO
L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 20-21 (Paper No. 212, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1073142 (study of wiretap warrants indicating that law
enforcement is willing to expend the most resources on investigations of serious
crimes.).
53 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1999, at
50.
54 GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 39,43 (2007).
55 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
56 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000) (4.7% of the cars
stopped at a roadblock set up in a high crime area produced evidence of drug-related
crime and another 4.2% of the cars contained evidence of non-drug related crime).
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The conjecture that police officers conducting stops often follow a
discriminatory selection policy is bolstered by a third study of
175,000 pedestrian stops by New York City police, which found
that persons of African and Hispanic descent were stopped more
frequently than whites, even after controlling for precinct
variability and race specific estimates of crime participation.57
This latter finding is also important because it suggests that
requiring police to report their stops doesn't keep them from
targeting people of color. However, research in the United
Kingdom indicates that a robust reporting requirement of the type
instituted there-which, it will be recalled, involves not only filing
the report but giving a copy to the target-might have a felicitous
effect. Joel Miller's study of "disproportionality" found that once
London, which accounts for 40% of all stops in the Untied
Kingdom, is taken out of the analysis, stops of minority
individuals went into a "much sharper and consistent decline"
after the reforms were instituted, with only a small drop in arrest
rates over the long-term.
C. Exclusion
The United States is the only country in the world that
routinely excludes evidence obtained through an illegal search and
57 Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City
Police Department's "Stop and Frisk" Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias,
102 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 813, 813-16 (2007). Another study, conducted in Richmond,
Va., found that initial stops were based on variations in crime rate rather than race, but
that subsequent searches disproportionately affected African-Americans. Matthew
Petrocelli, Alexander Piquero & Michael R. Smith, Conflict Theory and Racial
Profiling: An Empirical Analysis of Police Traffic Stop Data, 31 J. CRIM. JuST. 1, 8-9
(2003). Finally, an analysis of data on vehicle stops in Maryland concluded that
although 63% of those stopped were African-American, the hit-rate associated with those
stops was virtually identical to the hit rate for whites (34 to 32%), but three times that of
the hit rate for Hispanics (11%). Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, The Hit Rate Test for
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches, 25 JUST. Q. 37, 48-49 (2008).
58 Joel Miller, Stop and Search in England: A Reformed Tactic or Business as
Usual?, 50 BRIT J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 954, 964-65 (2010) (reporting arrest rates of 11-
14% pre-reform and 11-12% post-reform). At the same time, Miller found that
disproportionality increased in London and two other major metropolitan areas after the
reforms. Miller speculated that this increase was due to enhanced counter-terrorism
efforts in these areas or greater resistance on the part of large urban police forces to
efforts at changing well-engrained practices. Id. at 969-70.
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seizure." One rationale for doing so-the primary one according
to today's Supreme Court-is that exclusion deters bad faith
violations by the police."o There is no doubt that exclusion creates
some disincentive to engage in illegal actions. The important
empirical question is whether alternative sanctions come closer to
achieving an optimal balance between deterring police misconduct
and effective law enforcement.
Thomas Davies' 1974 review of research in the United States
on this topic, looking at studies examining police behavior before
and after the exclusionary rule was adopted nationwide in 1961,
concluded that because of methodological difficulties "there is
virtually no likelihood" that "relevant statistics" regarding the
effectiveness of the rule will be forthcoming from that source.6'
But interviews with police operating under the exclusionary rule
indicate that many of them routinely conduct searches or seizures
they know or suspect are unconstitutional, 62  and tests examining
knowledge among American police of search and seizure law,
which one would hope the rule would enhance, indicate that as a
group they do no better than chance in answering questions about
Fourth Amendment doctrine. 63  Thus, I concluded ten years ago
that the rule may not be particularly good at deterring police
misconduct.'
59 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1973).
60 Id. ("the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures").
61 Thomas Y. Davies, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the
Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra,
69Nw. U. L. REV. 740, 763-64 (1977).
62 Ronald L. Akers & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Exclusionary Rule: Legal Doctrine
and Social Research on Constitutional Norms, 2 SAM HOUSTON ST. U. CRIM. JUST. CENT.
RES. BULL. I (1986) (Interviews of police in two mid-size jurisdictions indicating that
19% conducted searches of "questionable" constitutionality at least once a month and
4% said they conducted searches they "knew" to be unconstitutional once a month.).
63 See William C. Heffeman & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U.
MIcH J.L. REFORM 311, 332-33 (1991); see also Eugene Michael Hyman, In Pursuit ofa
More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAC. L.J. 33, 47
(1979); Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary
Rule, 83 IOwA L. REv. 669, 727 (1999).
6 See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 432-35.
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Relying on the hit rate research described in the preceding two
sections, Don Dripps has come to similar conclusions, at least
outside the home search scenario. In the latter situation, he
suggests that, given the above reported hit rates-well above the
50% level that probable cause would seem to imply-the
combination of the rule and the warrant requirement either over
deters or amounts to optimal deterrence, given the special sanctity
associated with the home.65 However, he also argued that the hit
rates in other areas of police investigation, particularly in
connection with police stops (where the hit rate should arguably be
well above 10%) but also with respect to searches of cars (where
the hit rate should be close to 50%), suggest that the rule is to
some degree an under deterrent.66
More importantly, this analysis doesn't tell us whether we
might come closer to optimal deterrence through some other sort
of mechanism. Perhaps administrative sanctions of the type
purportedly imposed in Germany or reporting requirements of the
type now required in the United Kingdom would produce hit rates
even more congruent with search and seizure requirements.6 7
Another option worth exploring would be a damages regime that
requires officers to pay for bad faith illegalities (thus maximizing
individual deterrence) and departments to pay for good faith
68violations (thus maximizing training incentives).
These alternatives would also have to be investigated in terms
of their impact on crime control. Early studies show that the
exclusionary rule results in a lost conviction rate of between 1.5%
and 7% depending on the type of crime,69 and econometric
research conducted since 2000 suggests that the rule increases the
crime rate significantly. 0 An oft-made retort to these types of
65 Donald A. Dripps, The "New" Exclusionary Rule Debate: From "Still
Preoccupied with 1985" to "Virtual Deterrence," 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 743, 770
(2009).
66 Id. at 777 (street stops); id. at 773 (car searches).
67 See Miller, supra note 58.
68 See generally Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 363, 368-84 (discussing behavioral theory and its
effects on the exclusionary rule).
69 See Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n. 6 (1984) (summary of data).
70 See Raymond A. Atkins & Paul Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime
Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J. L. & ECON. 157,
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reports is that any other deterrent-say the damages regime
described above-that is equal in effectiveness to the rule would
lose as many convictions because the police would not undertake
the search in the first instance." In contrast to administrative or
civil remedies, however, the rule conspicuously advertises lost
convictions, either by letting a known criminal go free or by
forcing the legal system to go through a charade trial conducted by
lawyers and presided over by a judge who must keep the jury
ignorant of the illegally obtained evidence.72
There are other costs to the rule as well. The dominance of the
rule in the United States means that most search and seizures
claims are made by guilty people.73 Judges naturally resist
expansive search and seizure protections when they know
dismissal of charges is the likely result.74 The rule's dominance
has probably also led to the atrophy of alternative remedies,
meaning that innocent people have little recourse despite the fact
that, as we know from the hit rate data, well over half of those who
are subject to searches and seizures outside the home are clean at
the time of the search." Better information about whether other
remedies for illegal searches and seizures are in fact "futile," as
the Supreme Court has asserted," would be very useful.
173 (2003) (Following Mapp, "crime rates rose sharply as compared with the crime rates
of cities that had already excluded unlawfully obtained evidence, an effect that continued
to increase over time.").
71 Yale Kamisar, 'Comparative Reprehensibility' and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 47 n.211 (1987) (citing John Kaplan, The Limits
of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1037 (1974)).
72 See Slobogin, supra note 68, at 436-37.
73 See id at 403.
74 See id. at 400-05 (noting that the rule associates the Fourth Amendment with
criminals and discussing how the representativeness and availability heuristics probably
skew judicial decision-making in this area).
75 See id at 385-86 (marshaling evidence that civil suits "are few and far between"
and "seldom completely successful"); cf Kenneth J. Novak, Brad W. Smith & James
Frank, Strange Bedfellows: Civil Liability and Aggressive Policing, 26 POLICING: AN
INT'L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES AND MGMT. 352, 363 (2003) (study of police attitudes in
Cincinnati concluding that "officer-initiated aggressive behaviors . . . do not seem to be
deterred to any substantial extent by concerns about civil liability.").
76 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
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D. Interrogation Warnings
In my earlier work, I described research indicating that a large
percentage of the American population knew about the Miranda
warnings, that police conducted fewer interrogations post-
Miranda, and that the confession rate dropped between 4% to 9%
after Miranda, all of which suggests that the warnings alleviate
interrogation coerciveness by making clear silence is an option.77
However, research conducted both before and after that article was
published also indicates that upwards of 80%, and perhaps as
many as 96%, of all U.S. suspects waive their rights and that 45%
to 65% of interrogated suspects still make incriminating
statements. Apparently, few of those subjected to interrogation
choose to remain silent, even though that is likely the most prudent
course, at least until one has conferred with an attorney.
When the suspect is young or mentally disabled, this outcome
is perhaps not surprising. For instance, one relatively recent study
confirmed that people with mental retardation "simply do not
understand their Miranda rights," and that even those with IQs up
to about eighty-five have real difficulty doing so." Similarly,
several studies have concluded that most juveniles under fourteen
and many from fourteen to eighteen lack the linguistic skills
necessary to comprehend and respond to the warnings.o
What is more surprising is research testing the ability of non-
disabled adults to understand the warnings. In one recent survey
of adult defendants and college students in the United States, 30%
believed that silence could be used as evidence, 25.9% believed
77 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 447-48.
78 George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
Embedded in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 237, 247 (2002).
79 Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions,
and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 536, 590 (2002) ("The
empirical research conducted in this study shows that contrary to Miranda's core
assumption, retarded people simply do not understand their Miranda rights. . . . The
results of our study suggest that people who are not classified as retarded, but who have
low IQs, also may not understand the warnings.").
80 See Alison D. Redlich & Saul D. Kassin, Police Interrogation and False
Confessions: The Inherent Risk of Youth, 34 PSYCHOL. SCI. & THE LAw. 275, 283 (Bette
L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009) (describing research from Grisso, Peterson-Badali & Koegl,
and from Redlich et al. to the effect "that juveniles aged 14 years and younger do not
possess an adequate understanding and appreciation of their Miranda rights to the same
degree as older teens and adults.").
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that a waiver must be signed to be valid, 52% thought that "off the
record" comments were inadmissible, 12.8% believed that
statements could be retracted, and 30.2% believed that once
counsel is requested questioning could continue until counsel
arrived."' These misunderstandings did not correlate with
intelligence or experience.82 In particular "years of 'attained'
education had virtually no relationship to Miranda knowledge.""
These findings help explain why confession rates have
remained fairly steady despite Miranda. But however poorly
understood, perhaps the warnings are better than nothing in terms
of providing suspects with some defense against inquisitive police.
Empirical data from the United Kingdom is informative on this
issue. In that country the confession rate prior to 1986, when no
cautions were required, ranged between 65% and 75%, figures that
are higher-on average, 20% higher-than the post-Miranda
confession rate.84 From 1986 to 1994, when cautions were
required and adverse inferences could not be drawn-the British
regime that comes closest to mimicking Miranda-the confession
rate went down to between 40% and 50%, a number comparable
to the lower end of the post-Miranda confession rates reported in
the United States." After 1994, when cautions were given but the
adverse consequences admonition was added, the confession rates
went back up to between 55% and 58%.86
81 Richard Rogers, Jill E. Rogstad & Nathan D. Gillard, "Everyone Knows Their
Miranda Rights ": Implicit Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 300, 307-11 (2010).
82 Id. at 312-13 ("[The] most salient finding is that years of "attained" education
had virtually no relationship to Miranda knowledge.").
83 Id. at 312.
84 Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 126-29
(1986).
85 GISu H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS: CONFESSIONS AND
TESTIMONY 324 (1992); John Baldwin, Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth
or Proof?, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 325, 335 (1993) (examining confession rates
between 1989-90).
86 See TOM BUCKLE ET AL., THE RIGHT OF SILENCE: THE IMPACT OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT OF 1994, at 30-35 (Home Office Research Study 2000)
(55%); see also Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source
of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 799, 829 n. 129 (1998) (58%). But see Ian
Bryan, Shifting Images: Police-Suspect Encounters During Custodial Interrogations, 17
LEGAL STUD. 215, 231-32 (1997) (comparing 400 pre-1994 interrogations with 248 post-
2011] 337
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
These rates must be taken with a grain of salt, since different
researchers might well define the outcome measure ("confession")
differently." Furthermore, even a denial of crime can provide
incriminating information if it conflicts with well-established
evidence, places the suspect at the scene of the crime, or in some
other way facilitates the state's case. Nonetheless, taking the data
at face value, the right-to-silence warnings do seem to have a non-
trivial, albeit relatively small impact on confession rates. At the
same time, the confession rate under Miranda (45% to 65%) may
not be appreciably different than the confession rate under the
current English approach (55% to 58%), which adds the adverse
consequences warning." That finding might mean that the
adverse warning has no significant effect on confessions. Or it
could be explained by differences between European and
American interrogation techniques, which is discussed next.
E. Deception and Trickery During Interrogation
Virtually all U.S. interrogation manuals advocate the use of
minimization and maximization techniques during questioning, at
least once police believe they have probable cause.89 The
minimization technique is designed to lull suspects into a false
sense of security by blaming the victim, downplaying the
seriousness of the crime, or suggesting face-saving excuses and
sympathy.90 The maximization technique involves exaggerating
1994 interrogations in the U.K., and finding confession rates of 88.1% and 87%,
respectively, indicating that adverse warnings did not raise confession rates.).
87 See BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 86 and accompanying text (citing different
confession rates from different studies). For instance, a bad alibi or a statement placing
the suspect at the scene of the crime can provide incriminating information to the police.
88 Even the Bryan study, which reported significantly higher confession rates,
found no difference between confession rates in a Miranda-type regime and in an
adverse caution-type regime. See Bryan, supra note 86.
89 Fadia M. Narchet et al., A Quantitative Analysis of Classical and Modern Day
Police Interrogation Manuals (2004) (presented at the American Society of
Criminology Conference in Nashville, TN) (reporting survey of thirteen interrogation
manuals indicating: 100% of the manuals advocated some type of minimization
technique; 80% suggested that police interviewers blame the victim; 92% suggested that
the police offer face-saving excuses to the suspect; 92% were found to recommend
maximization techniques; and 77% suggested the use of false evidence.).
90 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 3, 27-28 (2010).
338 [Vol. XXXVII
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICISM
the seriousness of the offense and making false claims about the
available evidence.9' These interrogation tactics appear to be
widely used in the United States, at least when the suspect does
not confess within a short period of time.92
Over the past couple of decades police in the United Kingdom
and some other European countries have been moving away from
these types of techniques.9 3  Instead, many police are said to
engage in "investigative interviewing," which eschews
deception.94 Suspects are asked open-ended questions and then
confronted with non-manufactured evidence if their statements are
inconsistent with that evidence.9 s
A key question is the relative efficacy of these techniques in
producing true positives (confessions from guilty people) and
avoiding false negatives (erroneous confessions). The one field
study on this topic involved two Australian samples subjected to
either investigative or investigative techniques; full confessions
were obtained at about an equal clip in both samples (22% to 24%,
respectively) whereas partial admissions were much more
commonly produced by the officers who used accusatorial
techniques (16% to 50%).96 Assuming all or almost all of these
people were guilty of their charges, this preliminary study suggests
that "American-style" questioning is somewhat more efficacious
at obtaining true positives without a significant increase in false
negatives.9 7
91 Id.
92 Id. at 11-12.
93 Id. at 73 (citing a recent transition from classic interrogations to investigative
interviewing).
94 Id. at 14.
95 Andy Griffiths & Becky Milne, Will It All End in Tiers? Police Interviews with
Suspects in Britain, in 31 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, RTs., RES. & REG. 167, 170-74
(2009) (describing British efforts starting in the mid-1990s "to train every officer in
England and Wales of inspector rank and below" in investigative interviewing, which
permits challenging with actual evidence, but prohibits "judgemental or inappropriate"
conduct "even where it seems obvious that the suspect is lying.").
96 David Dixon, Interrogating Myths: A Comparative Study ofPractices, Research,
and Regulation, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689358).
97 However, a meta-analysis of laboratory studies concluded that "accusatorial"
methods yield an increase in both true and false confessions. Christian A. Meissner et al.,
Interview and Interrogation Methods and Their Effects on True and False Confessions,
Final Report, May, 2011, at 20 (on file with author).
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More data about false negatives comes from the sizeable
number of people in the United States whom DNA-testing has
shown confessed to crimes they did not commit.98 Although
researchers have failed to produce a viable false confession rate,
they have been able to pinpoint several risk factors for false
confessions, which include youth, intellectual and memory
impairment, drunkenness, certain psychiatric disorders, sleep
deprivation, and interrogation lasting more than six hours.99 Less
clear from this research is whether minimization and maximization
techniques used on a non-vulnerable suspect during an
interrogation that is not prolonged produce false confessions.
The best laboratory study designed to answer this question
found that 14% of the innocent participants subject to
maximization techniques and 18% of the innocent participants
subject to minimization tactics confessed.oo But 6% of the
innocent subjects who were not exposed to these tactics also
confessed, suggesting that the costs of confessing in this study
were not particularly high (which is not surprising given the
ethical constraints on creating a situation analogous to the criminal
interrogation setting).'o' Furthermore, the maximization technique
increased true positives by 30% and the minimization technique
increased true positives by 35%, which indicates that these ploys
might well increase interrogation efficacy.10 2
In short, research suggests that particularly vulnerable
populations, as well as individuals subjected to prolonged or harsh
interrogation conditions, are at significantly increased risk of
confessing falsely.'0 3 But the use of deception per se is not as
clearly a risk factor for false positives.104 Of course, there may be
98 See Kassin et al., supra note 90, at 3, 43.
99 Id. at 19-22.
100 Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions with a
Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. Sa. 481-84 (2006).
101 Id. at 483-84; cf Robert Horselenberg et al., False Confessions in the Lab: Do
Plausibility and Consequences Matter?, 12 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 61, 71-73 (2006)
(finding that increasing the potential consequences of a confession in simulation research
dramatically reduced the rate of false confessions).
102 See Russano et al., supra note 100, at 484 tbl.1.
103 See generally Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEx. TECH. L.




normative reasons for prohibiting trickery during interrogations,
and certain types of trickery may also become coercive.'os But
these types of concerns are not easily amenable to empirical
investigation.
F. Recording Interrogations
The United Kingdom and many local jurisdictions in the
United States require taping of all or part of the interrogation. 06 It
is said that taping will not only expose police improprieties, but
also prevent suspects from lying about the interview. 0 7 A further
possible benefit of taping is that judges who view tapes and read
transcripts will be better acquainted with the reality of
interrogation, so that judicial decisions defining when confessions
are voluntary will be more precise and meaningful.'
Most relevant here is the effect of taping on confession rates. I
reported in my earlier work that empirical evidence from the
United Kingdom indicates that taping has not reduced the
confession rate and that almost 60% of American jurisdictions that
use taping report an increased amount of incriminating
information from suspects, probably because a better record of
those statements exists.'0 9 No direct comparison of interrogations
on- and off-camera has been conducted since that time.
However, a fair amount of recent research has investigated the
best method of implementing a taping requirement. Studies
carried out by Daniel Lassiter and his colleagues indicate that fact
finders are much more likely to find a confession "voluntary"
when the camera focuses solely on the suspect, as opposed to the
suspect and the questioner."o Apparently, in the absence of
information about the inquisitor's demeanor and the interaction
between that person and the suspect, confessions tend to be taken
105 See generally id.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
107 William A. Geller, Videotaping and Confessions, in THE IFRANDA DEBATE, LAW.
JUSTICE & POLICING 303, 307-09 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas Ill eds., 1998).
108 Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 315-16
(2003) (noting that civil litigants insist on transcripts in analogous contexts).
109 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 450-51.
110 See G. Daniel Lassiter & Michael J. Lindberg, Video Recording Custodial
Interrogations: Implications of Psychological Science for Policy and Practice, 38 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 177, 184-85 (2010).
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at face value."' Again, this research tells us very little about true
and false positives, but it does suggest that relying solely on
transcripts or notes makes analysis of interrogations very difficult.
IV. Where to Go From Here
Policymakers both here and abroad could benefit from solid
empirical information about the efficacy of various approaches to
regulating police investigations. To date, such information is
scanty (the Appendix to this article summarizes what little is
known and what could be discovered about the efficacy of
searches, seizures, and interrogations). Here I propose several
comparative studies that might rectify that situation. The
advantage of comparative research is that it can provide a
naturalistic evaluation of several different types of regulatory
regimes that would be impossible or difficult to reproduce
domestically given the uniformity of rules between jurisdictions.
Of course, any such comparisons must be accompanied by the
major caveat that data about just one aspect of a system, such as
how it carries out searches or conducts interrogations, may provide
a misleading picture of how the entire system works. Conclusions
based solely on evaluation of success rates associated with
searches or interrogations could well mask the effect of other parts
of the regulatory regime and police and judicial attitudes, and
could vary significantly if variables such as crime rates or the
types of crimes investigated cannot be held constant." 2 But
regression analysis might be able to factor out at least some of
these confounds. In any event, this type of comparative
information would be a start toward understanding how well
various combinations of rules governing police investigatory
practices work.
tIl See id.
i12 It is often said, for instance, that European police are more "professional" than
American police, and thus can be trusted to obey the rules to a greater extent. John H.
Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality,
87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555-56, 1563-69 (1978). A second difference, relevant to the
interrogation setting, is that the right to silence at trial is severely circumscribed in
Europe, thus perhaps creating additional incentives to talk to police. See, e.g., Frase,
supra note 8, at 228. Empirical research can also test these propositions.
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A. Studies Relevant to Regulation ofSearches & Seizures
The foregoing discussion raises at least three distinct issues in
connection with searches and seizures. The first is which
combination of warrant and remedy rules produces an optimal
regulatory approach toward searches of homes, the domain that, in
any country, is entitled to the most protection. The hit rate data
from the United States suggest that a relatively robust warrant
requirement together with the exclusionary rule over-deters police,
if we assume probable cause is the correct standard and that this
standard should produce a 50% to 70% hit rate."' Thus, it would
be very useful to obtain hit rate information for non-consensual
house searches in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France,
countries that are much less likely to require a warrant and rarely
require exclusion. It would also be useful to obtain such data from
Italy, a country that has a relatively stringent warrant requirement
similar to the warrant rule in the United States, but that, like its
northern neighbors, rarely excludes illegally seized evidence.'"
The second issue raised by the foregoing discussion relates to
stops and searches in the streets. All countries permit stops on
some version of reasonable suspicion, and most allow further
searches upon development of additional suspicion."' The
potential for these types of actions to disrupt the lives of innocent
people, particularly those of color, is high, but at the same time
apparently every country believes they are necessary as a crime
prevention technique. Considering these competing values, a hit
rate of 10%, which may be typical for American police stops,
might be too low, while a hit rate of 50% for stops and any
subsequent frisks or searches-approaching what might be
required for searches of homes-might require too much of the
113 When asked to quantify the level of certainty represented by the phrases
"probable cause," and "reasonable suspicion, 166 federal judges gave, as an average
response, 45.78% and 31.34%, respectively. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof
Degrees of Belief Quanta ofEvidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv.
1293, 1327-28 (1982).
114 Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 303, 315 (explaining that
warrants are required for searches of residences except in "urgent situations"); id. at 321
(exclusionary provision "has little to no effect on the use of evidence obtained pursuant
to an illegal search").
115 See generally Feldman, supra note 6 (describing various nations' approaches to
searches and seizures).
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police for these relatively less intrusive actions. A procedure that
produced a hit rate of 20% to 30% for stops and 40% to 50% for
subsequent searches, while avoiding disproportionate impact on
people of color, might be optimal."' More elaborate information
about both hit rates and racial impacts associated with reporting
requirements such as those implemented in the United Kingdom
and the identity detentions used in France would be of great value
in figuring out the optimal rules in this setting.
A third search and seizure issue that might be studied
comparatively is the effect of different consent rules. The United
Kingdom requires that before premises can be searched pursuant
to consent homeowners must be informed of their right to refuse
consent, and any consent given must be in writing."' France also
requires that consents to home searches be in writing."' Of
interest in determining the impact of these varying rules would be
the consent rate and the hit rates of consent searches in the United
Kingdom and France in comparison to the same rates in U.S.
jurisdictions, where consent need not be in writing and those asked
for consent need not be told of their right to refuse it.
Of course, use of hit rates only measures one aspect of
investigative success. In social science terms, it provides a
measurement of "Type I" error, or the extent to which a prediction
that evidence will be found is erroneous. Type II error, or the
extent to which a given regulatory regime discourages searches
that would have resulted in discovery of evidence, is also
important to measure."' Perhaps data could be collected from
police on the number of searches they declined to carry out
because of warrant, reporting, or consent requirements. Or
perhaps some type of comparison can be made in terms of the
number of house searches and stops that are made in countries
with different regulatory regimes, holding crime rates and other
pertinent variables constant. In reality, however, the false negative
rate in the search setting probably cannot be measured even
116 See McCauliffsupra note 113, at 1327-28 (quantifying reasonable suspicion).
117 See supra text accompany notes 6-7.
118 See id.
119 Type I error is associated with "false positives" (an erroneous prediction that a
search will produce evidence) and Type II error with "false negatives" (an erroneous
prediction that a search will not produce evidence).
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speculatively. Nonetheless, Type I error rates alone can be
helpful. If they are the same across regulatory regimes, one could
conclude that warrants and written consent are not crucial to
protecting individual interests. If, on the other hand, regimes with
such requirements have higher hit rates, we could tentatively
conclude they do provide some protection, while remaining
unclear as to the crime control cost of this protection.
B. Studies Relevant to Regulation ofInterrogation
Every country described in this article wants to avoid coerced
confessions and, to that end, all require that suspects be told of
their right to remain silent.'2 0 All of these nations also want to
provide counsel to those subject to interrogation, albeit at different
stages of the process and with varying understandings as to
counsel's role.' At the same time, confessions are a staple of
criminal prosecutions in every one of these countries.122 As with
search and seizure rules, country-by-country variations in
interrogation rules provide a rich sampling of different approaches
to regulation of interrogation that would aid policy makers in
figuring out the most effective way to achieve these competing
goals.
Particularly useful would be collection of confession and
clearance rate information for each country, holding constant as
many non-regulatory factors as possible.123 Such data would allow
efficacy comparisons of the relatively stringent warnings and
exclusion regime found in the United States with other regimes,
like that found in the United Kingdom, that require earlier-stage
warnings, a caution about the adverse use of silence and a
relatively stringent exclusionary remedy, and with regimes that,
like Germany, adopt the first two facets of the U.K. system but a
120 See supra Part 11-B.
121 See id
122 See id
123 In the United States, scholars have attempted to obtain confession and clearance
rate information prior to and after Miranda, but numerous problems, including record
and definitional difficulties that a modem comparative project could avoid, made
empirical assessment extremely difficult. See Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda 's Practical
Effects: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500,
506-07 (1996); see also Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the
Impact ofMiranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 11-18 (2000).
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much more relaxed approach to exclusion.12 4 These regimes could
be compared to pre-2011 France, which provided neither a
warning about the right to silence nor easy access to an attorney,
and which rarely excluded confessions.125 If the confession rates
are similar across regimes, the assertion by some that warnings are
misunderstood, undercut, or worked around would tend to be
supported.12 6  If confession rates are relatively lower in all
warnings regimes, the U.K. and U.S. regimes, or the U.S. regime
alone, but clearance rates are similar across all regimes, then
assertions that warnings and exclusion harm law enforcement
might need to be rethought.
Of course, a significant difference in confession rates between
two types of regimes would not directly test the ultimate question
of whether a particular regulatory approach is better or worse at
avoiding coerced confessions. It would also say little about the
effect of the "trickery" which plays a greater role in American
jurisdictions. Given the difficulty of defining and testing for
coercion, a more indirect empirical approach to these topics might
be advisable. Specifically, researchers could compare the
confession and clearance rates of interrogators using American-
style questioning with those relying on "investigative
interviewing," both taped and untaped. If confession rates are the
same under both styles of questioning, then the argument for
abandoning maximization and minimization techniques would be
stronger. If the confession rate for taped and untaped
interrogations using the same interrogation technique is similar,
then the argument for taping is stronger, given the usefulness of
taping-at least dual-party taping-for analyzing voluntariness
issues.
While these studies looking at the impact of questioning style
and taping could, in theory, be carried out domestically, the
already-existing differences between the United Kingdom,
Australia, and the United States in these areas makes comparative
124 See Kassin et al., supra note 90, at 76-77.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 24-44.
126 George Thomas & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda: "Embedded" in Our
National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 256 (2002) ("In short, the empirical evidence
to date, though highly imperfect, suggests that as a safeguard, Miranda offers few
tangible benefits to suspects.").
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empiricism an attractive option. Australia would need to be added
into the mix because, like the United Kingdom, it is moving
toward investigative interviewing but, in contrast to the United
Kingdom and like the United States, it does not allow questioning
of suspects after they have indicated a desire to remain silent, nor
does it permit an adverse consequences caution.12 7 Confession and
clearance rates from these three regimes would significantly
improve our understanding of these varying approaches.
Note that, in contrast to the search context, here Type I error
(the extent to which heightened legal restrictions prevent
confessions or convictions) is easier to measure. Although we
often will not know for sure who is guilty among those who resist
confessing (and thus can't calculate the overall crime control cost
of a given regulatory approach), we can get a next-best
comparison of crime-solving success rates if we assume, as I think
we can, that virtually all of those who confess are guilty.
However, the latter fact means that measuring Type I error-the
extent to which a regime produces false confessions-will be
almost impossible; the small number of false confessions,
combined with the difficulty of figuring out when a confession is
in fact false, virtually assures failure.128 If the goal is to obtain
information about potential false positive rates, laboratory studies
may be the only feasible approach. 129
V. Conclusion
Comparative empirical studies can provide useful insights into
the effectiveness of different approaches to regulating police
investigating techniques. In contrast to those working in domestic
settings, researchers engaging in comparative work do not have to
manufacture laboratory scenarios, manipulate rules, or worry
about violating domestic law. Of course, there are other,
significant methodological challenges in carrying out comparative
127 See McKinney v. The Queen, 171 C.L.R 468 (1991); see also Wayne T.
Westling & Vicki Waye, Videotaping Police Interrogations: Lessons from Australia, 25
AM. J. CRIM. L. 493, 532-42 (1998).
128 Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O'Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False
Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 927, 958 (2008) ("Our main message is gloomy. We do not know much
about false convictions, and it will be difficult to learn more.").
129 See, generally Russano et al., supra note 100.
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empiricism, given the ubiquity of third variables, including the
interaction of investigatory regulations with other criminal
procedure rules and the influence of cultural norms. But as
globalization homogenizes the world's legal systems, these types
of studies can provide an increasingly meaningful method of
informing debates about the best way to allow police to enforce
the law without trenching unduly on citizens' liberty interests.
APPENDIX
Comparative Empiricism re Search & Seizure and Interrogation
(Using search hit-rates and interrogation confession-rates)
Country United United Germany France Australia Italy
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